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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature 0f the Case.

A.

Appellants,

by and through

their attorney

this Appellants’

of record, ﬁle

Opening Brief

appealing from the District Court’s entry 0f Summary Judgment in favor 0f Defendant Respondent.

This

is

a case involving misuse 0f solicited investment funds by the promoter 0f a start—up

company, Respondent Gateway Parks
its

LLC (“Gateway Parks”).

Beginning in March 2013, through

promoter, Gateway Parks began soliciting investment funds from the Plaintiff Dr. Scott Carter

(“Carter”)

by promoting

the business

and tubing, located near populated
used

to set

up the

entity

model of small

cities.

terrain

snow

parks, for snowboarding, skiing,

Gateway Parks represented

that funds invested

and expand ﬁrst with a new location near the City of Eagle. Carter relied 0n

the material term 0f the intended use 0f the invested funds.

Carter

was induced t0 begin investing on

June 10, 2013 and continued through January 2014 in various tranches with the
$200,000. Not until

would be

May

17,

total

amounting

2016, did Carter discover that the ﬁrst $125,000 0f invested funds were

misused and misdirected into the promoter’s other existing

entities’

bank accounts and used

for the

personal expenditures of the promoter and other past due business expenses 0f an entity Which

under ﬁnancial
B.

to

was

distress.

Course 0f the Proceedings.

Neptune Case.

Prior to the present case, Carter pursued a Complaint for breach 0f an oral loan

unjust enn'chment against

the case 0f Carter

v.

Ryan Neptune and his

solely

owned

Neptune, Case No. 1503299, Dist. Court,

was not a party t0 the Neptune Case.

entity

Neptune

and

Industries, Inc. (“Neptune”), in

Ada County (“Neptune

Case”).

Gateway Parks

Carter pursued this loan claim in the Neptune Case because: (1)

Gateway

Parks was not formed as an entity until months after Neptune solicited and obtained the ﬁrst $125,000 in
advances; (2)

the checks advanced were

all

made

out to Neptune personally, at his direction; and (3)

contemporaneously with the ﬁrst advance, Neptune issued an unsigned “Investment and Loan Agreement” for

pay back of the funds plus 10%

interest

by Neptune.

Neptune’s defense in the Neptune Case was that the funds were not loaned t0 him but were an equity
investment in Gateway Parks.

Although requested in discovery Neptune delayed and withheld the bank

statements from the bank in Which the solicited funds were deposited.

stated that all the funds

were “used for any and all things Gateway Parkes

then vacated, and then reset t0 July 20, 2016.

May 3, 2016

in

“D0 you have
357.)

As

Which Neptune was pressed again

trial

for production 0f the

bank

those bank statements?” to Which Neptune testiﬁed, “No.

0n mostly personal items ofNeptune’s
Neptune

for past

related.” (R., p. 450.)

Trial

was

set,

approached, the deposition of Neptune was taken 0n

The bank statements were ﬁnally produced on May

bills for

Discovery responses from Neptune

17,

I

statements.

Neptune was asked

can get them eventually.”

(R., p.

201 6 showing Neptune spent the ﬁrst $125,000

due home mortgage, back wages, back taxes and other past due

Industries, Inc. (R., pp. 359-388.)

The bank statement evidence strengthened

loan case against Neptune and the case proceeded through a court

trial

the personal

on July 20-21, 28, and August 18-19,

2016. However, the District Court ruled against Carter’s loan claim ﬁnding on disputed facts that the $200,000
in funds

were

all

equity investments in

Gateway

Parks.

No

0r misuse 0f the funds raised in the Neptune Case. Carter

appeal was ﬁled. There were no issues of fraud,

was now bound by the ﬁnding

that the funds

were

an equity investment in Gateway Parks, and he then turned t0 his remedies against Gateway Parks in this present
case.

Gateway Case — Present Case. The Complaint against Gateway Parks in this case was ﬁled on May
14, 2018, less than

two years

after discovering the

use 0f the funds from the bank statements. The Complaint

alleged two counts: Count One for Fraud in the Inducement; and Count

Two for Violations ofthe Idaho Uniform

Securities

Act 0f 2004, Idaho Code

§

30-14-501

-

General Fraud. The facts Viewed most favorable t0 the

Carters, although disputed, established all elements of the causes of action.

two years of discovery of the

securities Violations in

The Complaint was ﬁled Within

compliance With Idaho Code

§

30—14—509G)(2) and

within three years from discovery in compliance with Idaho Code § 5—21 8(4) for fraud. Defendant Gateway

Parks ﬁled

its

Motion

for

Summary Judgment 0n April 21,

Judgment with a memorandum
of Counsel with exhibits.

in opposition,

(R., pp.

202 -577.)

2019. Carter opposed the Motion for

Summary

Afﬁdavit 0f Carter with eighteen exhibits, and an Afﬁdavit

On June

11, 2019, the District

Court issued

its

Memorandum

0f Decision and Order 0n Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing the Complaint ﬁnding expiration of
the statute of limitations, lack 0f elements of fraud, and resjudz'cata. (R., pp. 725-732.)

On July 3 1, 2019

a timely Notice 0f Appeal

was ﬁled by

Carter. (R., pp. 813-8 17.)

2019, the District Court awarded costs and attorney fees against Carter in the
(Supp. R., pp. 55-60.)

On October

18,

total

On October

10,

amount 0f $58,677.

2019 a timely Amended Notice oprpeal was ﬁled by

Carter. (Supp.

R., pp. 63—68.)

Statement of the Facts.

C.

On

appeal from a

summary judgment

order, the

accepted and presumed to be true in the most favorable

From that

non-moving party’s afﬁdavits should be

light,

along with

all

reasonable inferences.

standard this Court should consider Dr. Carter’s afﬁdavit as the facts Where he testiﬁed

as follows:

1.

below. (R.,
2.

I

am a plaintiff in the

above case and have personal knowledge of the

facts stated

p. 222.)

Upon

ﬁnishing dental school and returning t0 Boise,

former high school friend, Ryan Neptune (“Neptune”).

I

became reacquainted with a

Beginning approximately March 2013,

Neptune began to promote “Gateway Parks” as a proposed
terrain parks for

and exchanged

1.

snowboarding, skiing, and tubing, located close t0 populated cities.

text

messages on the

and operate

We met in person

subject. (R., pp. 222-223.)

A true and correct copy 0f text messages between myself and Neptune are attached as

3.

Exhibit

staIT-up business t0 construct

(R., pp.

271-272.)

Carter, the following text

On March

exchange occurred between

Carter: “I highly doubt

Neptune:

it,

Gateway Parks some

[time] t0

me and Neptune:

but d0 you need an investor?

“We need investors

am horrible

26, 2013, after promoting

for sure

Have

tons and tons and tons looking t0 help

You would have t0 come over and I could
show you Where I am at With everything Had more amazing thoughts and ideas
come t0 me over night the past few days and I am building a plan around them
I’d have to give you a bigger picture Vision Ithink we have money lined up But I
I want to d0 this in Eagle and as many places as
Will never close options out
but

I

at

asking for help

possible t0 compliment Winter use

(R., p. 223.)

4.

The opportunity

for investment in

Gateway Parks was promoted

to

me by Neptune

through meetings and several detailed writings beginning by an email dated March 26, 2013 With a

“Gateway Parks Executive Summary,” a
which was backed up by colored graphs,
Parks was further promoted t0
for the Future

true

and correct copy of Which

proj actions,

and budgets. During

is

attached as Exhibit 2,

this

time frame, Gateway

me by Neptune by sharing With me “Gateway Parks - A Business Plan

0f Recreational Sports,” ofwhich a true and correct copy

is

attached as Exhibit

3.

(R.,

pp. 223, 276-285, 286-323.)

5.

I

was

further

promoted

t0,

and motivated With excitement through many emails

wherein Gateway Parks was being promoted t0 wealthy individuals associated in the snow sports

industry, such as

Mervin Manufacturing, Windells Camp, Zimmerman Ventures, Ripple Media, and

Michael Biber, a wealthy
forwarded by email t0

ski resort operator in the

me by

Neptune, dated March 26, 2013,

developing Gateway Parks eventually hitting in 3-5 years 50+
annually With a baseline of 15$ gross per Visit With

of 12.5mi1.”

For example, in an email

upper mid—west.

22+ mil

cities

it

was promoted

that “I see us

with a minimum of

1.5

mil

Visits

in gross sales with annual operating costs

A true and correct copy 0f the March 26, 2013

email

is

Those

attached as Exhibit 4.

types ofproj ections were repeated in subsequent emails forwarded t0 me, including an email between

Neptune and Ryan Hollis of Mervin Manufacturing dated April

16, 2013.

A true and correct copy of

that email is attached as Exhibit 5. (R., pp. 223-224, 324-330, 331-336.)

6.

I

continued to meet on a few occasions With Neptune as the promoter for Gateway

Parks during the spring of20 1 3.

me

On May 3, 20 1 3, Neptune as promoter for Gateway Parks, forwarded

an email from Michael Biber

SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO
email forwarded t0

7.

is

stated,

.”

“MY PLANS ARE TO PROVIDE/LOAN YOU

Attached as Exhibit 6

me from Neptune dated May 3, 2013.

Neptune represented on

my high

EXPAND

Neptune and

“200 [from me]

who

not

I

May

communicated through
14,

2013

Chump change

that

a true and correct copy of the

(R., pp. 224,

337-338.)

text messages, attached as Exhibit

1,

wherein

he was talking with investor Biber about “6mil” and that

for sure.” This

school friend would be willing to

is

let

me

in

was

all

very motivating and ﬂattering t0

0n ground ﬂoor

prospect of big investors prospects in the near future. (R., p. 224.)

t0

me that

Gateway Parks with such a

On about May 28,

8.

that

he made

some

t0

city ofﬁcials

near the City of Eagle.

9.

2013, Neptune invited

Iwas

me t0

attend a

Gateway Parks presentation

of Eagle, ID for the expansion of a Gateway Parks location in 0r

further impressed as a result. (R., p. 224.)

Iwas given representations from Neptune

that his other businesses

of fabrication and

welding through Neptune Industries and the terrain park “Superparks” in Lansing Michigan were
operating successfully and proﬁtably 0n their own.

had no information

I

March-June 20 1 3 timeframe that the promoter for Gateway Parks was
not t0 use the proposed investment funds as represented.

10.

Gateway

Parks, through

its

needed advanced would be used for the

if invested

Gateway Parks’

t0

representations through

By

June

6,

me

that funds

be developed in the City 0f Eagle.

would be used was an important and material term
Neptune

that the funds

Parks and expand a location for the City of Eagle. (R.,
11.

(R., p. 224.)

he

and expansion 0f Gateway Parks, and speciﬁcally

most talk and emphasis was placed 0n a new location
funds

in the

in ﬁnancial distress 0r intended

representative Neptune, represented t0

staIT-up

me

to suggest to

to the investment.

would be used

t0 set

I

How the
relied

on

up Gateway

p. 225.)

2013, Neptune 0n behalf 0f Gateway Parks, requested funds from

me by

text stating (R., p. 225):

Thursday 6/6/ 1 3
Neptune 10:08 AM: Good meeting this week Ifyou are still interested in investing Likely
won’t have investment monies till July 1 If you are interested It would help me
substantially right now until big money comes in I have the remaining 75k I had budgeted
for the next few months tied up in Osprey legal battle Maybe we look at somewhat of a
bridge loan with
Carter 11:35
it.

% going t0 auto equity

AM: You bet.

Give

Let

me know if we

can work something out

me a call. Maybe we can g0 t0 lunch today and tale about

Neptune 11:37
Carter 11:38

AM:

AM:

swing

right

now

Sounds good just

Neptune 2:54 PM:
Carter 8:06

Meeting

Just ﬁnished

PM: Talked

t0

call

back

at

me when your done

at the

Amy. She

eagle park

house Call

says yes.

me

at

your convenience

Lets talk tomorrow morning if you can

it.

Friday 6/7/ 1 3

Neptune

12: 10

Carter 12: 12

(R., pp.

PM: Great Thank you!

PM:

I

can have 30

263-264.)

Later in the day 0n June

12.

Investors” spreadsheet illustrating

with several other investor names,
t0

have

correct

their

amounts placed

0n the

it

initial

13.

12,

2013, Neptune forwarded t0

me by

email a “Data

me as investing $200,000 and Biber investing $3,000,000 along

whom he had told me were big players

in the spreadsheet.

(R., p. 226.)

(R., pp.

appeared that Biber was committed

group as an advantage.

in the ski industry, yet

Attached as Exhibit 7

a true and

is

339-348.) This email further excited
at a large

investment amount and

I

me

to

could get

(R., p. 226.)

Based upon the representations and assurances received from Gateway Parks through

Neptune, as outlined above,

June

6,

copy of that email and spreadsheet.

invest because

in

Monday 30 Wednesday 4O Thursday

I

advanced to Gateway Parks: $30,000 on June

2013. The checks were

on Neptune’s representations

made

out t0

that the funds

Parks including the Eagle location.

Ryan Neptune 0n his

would be used for the

10,

2013 and $70,000 0n

instructions. Itrusted

start—up

and

relied

and expansion of Gateway

We never signed an agreement regarding the funds,

although a

and Loan Agreement was drafted by Neptune and was discussed 0n June

draft Investment

7,

2013.

(R., p. 226.)

On July 23,

14.

2013, Neptune 0n behalf of Gateway Parks, contacted

me t0 invest more money. Neptune
Neptune:

mentioned

Carter:
to talk

(R., p. 254.)

LLC

Might

01'

stated (R., p. 226):

deﬂinately] Will need

I

it

so thought

I

should bring

should be able t0 do 25k without

it

.

Lets try

Neptune added a
lots

later text

0n July 28, 2013

On August

6,

stating:

of ﬂex on individual investments

2013,

I

.

.

.

as payee, as

issued another check

made

.”

“We

are setting

(R., p. 252.)

Iwas

it

up

as an

On August

instructed, in the

3,

amount

out t0 Neptune in the amount of

(R., pp. 226.)

15.

Gateway

.

up

much problem Sounds good

20 1 3, Carter Dental issued another check t0 Neptune

$15,000.

.

tomorrow

and that give us

of $10,000.

some more money real soon
more but I will need it You had

not sure if you even wanted to invest

anyway
just

I

me by text asking

I

Parks.

was never given an accounting 0n
I

assumed

that the checks 0r funds

the uses for the ﬁrst $125,000 advanced to

would be put

in a

Gateway Parks bank account

and used only for Gateway Parks’ purposes including the build out 0f the Eagle

location.

(R., p.

227.)

16.

On

January 16-17, 2014, Neptune asked

Gateway Parks purchase a parcel of
exchange

(R., p. 227):

Jan. 16,

2014

real property

me

known

as

for a loan 0f $35,000 t0 help

“Lazy J”

in the following text

Neptune: Might need a loan 35k

if to close

on lazy

J

Let

me know

if that’s a

possibility

Neptune:

I

Will see

What

Carter:

What we need

did you decide?

I

can go more

if

needed

Neptune: 35k

2014

Jan. 17,

Neptune: Can you have a cashiers check made out t0 First American Title?
Carter:

Did

have I’d

I’ll call

you

Ok Great

Neptune:
Carter:

It’s at

it.

How’d

Neptune:

bank 0n Chinden. Ask

for Jana.

You Will need t0

in 5

Thanks!!

things go?

won’t

I

the us

let

you down

0k!

l!

Neptune: Great Closed 0n it!
Neptune: Thanks so much for being a part 0f this

.

.

.

Glad all went well I’m impressed with you and your business. I also
appreciate your honesty. If you could just send me a text conﬁrming that I lent
you 35k for the purchase 0f the Lazy J property and you plan t0 pay it back in
10-30 days I would appreciate it. It doesn’t need t0 be in legalese
Carter:

Neptune:

hoped
(R., pp.

t0

.

.

to

days

And I would’ve

As was requested I advanced another $35,000 on January

company

Gateway Parks just
17.

We hope to have the funding Within 30

pay you back Within 10

239-240.)

to the title

.

Also

as requested.

rolled that

amount

in January, 2014,

ﬁnance an equipment purchase.

amount of $40,000

to help

The loan did not
into

17,

get re-paid as promised and

my investment amount.

January 30, 2014,

purchase equipment.

I

(R., p. 228.)

somehow

(R., p. 228.)

Gateway Parks, through Neptune, asked

On

2014 made out

for

more money

issued a check t0 Neptune in the

18.

A11 totaled,

representations from

correct

I

Gateway Parks

Ihad never signed an investment agreement, and Neptune had sometimes

referred t0

Attached as Exhibit 8

p. 228.)

Ada County Case No.

my

and trace What was done with the funds.

CV OC

Reponses

0f,

(R., p. 228.)

1503299. In that litigation

we

Attached as Exhibit 9

May 3,

2016, where

I

was

is

2016,

17,

to Plaintiffs’ First

.

.

.

my

attorney

how the

tried to

could account for
a true and correct

which he

funds were spent. (R., pp. 356-358.)

was served With Defendants’

First

Supplemental

Requests for Production to Defendants (“Supplemental Response”)

1671-1675 (“Bank Statements”).

(R., p. 228.)

A true

Response and Bank Statements are attached as Exhibit
I

had

present, in

along With documents attached including Wells Fargo bank statements marked

RN

I

and tried t0 avoid producing, the unredacted bank statements which would

the funds were deposited and trace

On May

349-355.)

checks had been deposited so that

copy 0f an excerpt from Neptune’s deposition 0n
withheld production

(R., pp.

On that basis, I sued Neptune 0n an oral loan claim in Carter v. Neptune

bank statements of wherever

20.

0f requests and
a true and

promoter/agent Neptune. (R.,

Fourth Judicial Dist,

show where

as a result

is

its

our arrangement as a “loan.”

get the

t0

copy 0f the schedule 0f investments and the checks attached.
19.

et. al.

advanced $200,000

did not have information 0r facts that

my

RN

1185-1204 and

and correct copy 0f said Supplemental

10. (R., pp.

359-388.) Prior to

May

17,

2013,

invested funds had been mis—spent 0n personal

expenditures of Neptune and/or past due 0r unrelated expenses 0f Neptune Industries, Inc. and/or

Superparks LLC. (R., pp. 228-229.)
21.

shocked,

felt

After reviewing the
betrayed, and

Bank Statements

after

was extremely disappointed

_lO_

to

May
ﬁnd

17,

that

2016

for the ﬁrst time,

my initial

I

was

$125,000 investment

LLC

checks in Gateway Parks
purposes as follows

had been misdirected and improperly used

for

non—Gateway Parks

(R., p. 229):

The non-Gateway Parks bank accounts that spent my investments were
extremely overdrawn With n0 funds and no income 0n June 6, 2013, the day Neptune
0n behalf of Gateway Parks was asking for funds and was giving glowing reports of
progress, other investors, and success, and 0n June 10, 2013 when my initial
investment of $30,000 was deposited (R., p. 229);
a.

$4,808 and 8/7/13

-

6/ 1 7/1 3

b.

-

0n the Neptune’s personal residence
-

6/17/13

c.

-

6/ 17/13

(R., pp. 368,

$900 paid

home

equity line of credit of the

maxed out at $250,000

t0 the savings accounts

(R., pp. 368, 369);

of the Neptunes’ minor children

398-403);
-

6/17/13

e.

(R., pp. 368, 373);

$2,686.25 paid to a personal

Neptunes’, Which was previously

d.

$2356. 1 8 paid for three past due house payments

One

$1,350 paid t0 Neptune’s personal Capitol

balance due on the card was past due and

maxed

out 0n

its

credit card.

The

credit limit (R., pp. 368,

404);

f.

for

$25,000 paid t0 attorneys for past due services, most 0f Which was
an 01d legal settlement dispute involving the “Otsego Contract” 0r “Osprey” from
-

6/1 1/13

years earlier (R., pp. 367, 417-419);

g.

-

6/12/13

$1,410 and $1,880, 6/19/17

accountants for past due tax

Neptunes
h.

-

$2,723

work ofNeptune Industries,

Inc.,

(total

$6,013) paid to

Superparks

LLC and/or

(R., pp. 367, 380, 420);

Numerous

6/26, 6/27,

transfers

and 8/7/13,

from Neptune

totaling over

supposedly proﬁtable entity

(R., pp.

Industries’ account

$23,000 to Superparks

0n

6/1

LLC

1,

6/17, 6/25,

in Michigan, a

366-371, 378-380, 373-374);

$9,234 drawn out personally by Neptune in various transfers in June-August
2013 traceable to my investments (R., pp. 366-371. 378-380. 373-374. 384-388);
i.

j.

k.

$14,543
7/5/13

-

total

payments 0n 6/17/13 and 8/15/13

to the

IRS

$359 for Neptunes’ personal health insurance
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(R., pp. 380, 374);

(R., p. 385);

1.

8/6/13

did not include

m.

-

$8,390 to Insurance agent for

LLC (R., pp.

Gateway Parks,

Hundreds 0f

liability insurance, for

businesses that

421-424);

what appear

be non—business expenditures for
Home Depot, Texas Roadhouse, Cobby’s Baja
Fred Meyer, iTunes, Villa Pizza, Border Cantina,

dollars in

t0

Delsea’ Ice Cream, McDonalds,
Fresh,

Sports

Authority,

Swim

Brookstone, Cable One,

Link Arena, and Wendy’s
n.

&

(R., pp.

In only a matter 0f a

,

Run

Shop, Nelsons

RV, Great

Harvest, Century

366-3714, 378-380, 373-374, 384-388)

few days

after

;

and

each deposit into the accounts from

my

investment checks, the bank accounts were once again overdrawn (R., pp. 385, 380,

374)
(R., pp.

229-230.)

22.

Prior to beginning t0 invest and advance funds for

Gateway Parks 0n June

10,

2013,

I

received n0 risk disclosure from Gateway Parks’ promoter/agent that the above improper uses would

be made 0f my investments. Speciﬁcally,
put

I

was not informed

0r advised that

Gateway Parks would

my investments into ﬁnancially distressed entities’ bank accounts to use the funds t0 pay past due

bills

and non—Gateway Parks’ expenditures, personal or business. Had the disclosure 0f the above

ﬁnancial conditions and proposed expenditures been

never invested the funds.
23.

made

t0

me by Gateway

Parks,

I

would have

(R., p. 230.)

Ireasonably relied on the representations

promoter Neptune, that the funds

I

made

to

me by Gateway Parks,

advanced for investment, were t0 be used t0

set

through

its

up Gateway Parks

and expand a location in the City 0f Eagle. Iunderstood that the promoter for Gateway Parks intended
for

me

that is

to rely

on

his representation.

It

was reasonable

for

me to

rely

on the representation because

What would move the Gateway Parks plan forward with the invested funds. The represented

intended use 0f the funds

was a

material term to me.
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Had I known that the

funds were intended by

Gateway Parks

t0

be used to pay unrelated personal expenses 0f Neptune 0r business expenses 0f

other entities such as Neptune Industries 0r Superparks

have never invested in the beginning.

disclosed t0

17,

230-23 1 .)

had the actual use of

In addition,

24.

(R., p.

LLC, Which were in ﬁnancial distress, Iwould

my

$125,000 investment checks been

initial

me and not concealed, Iwould have never continued t0

2014 and $40,000 on January

investment funds,

I

30, 2014.

a result 0f the misrepresentation and misuse of my

have been damaged by the loss 0f $200,000.

After reviewing the

25.

As

Bank

advance the $35,000 0n January

Statements,

I

(R., p.

23 1 .)

understood then

why Neptune 0n

Gateway Parks concealed them from me until he was forced to turn them over.
t0 claim that

had

I

only gone on some company Drobox

site I

understand Neptune

I

would have supposedly seen the Bank

Statements uploaded there and discovered the improper use 0f investment funds

tried to access

Drobox on one

Drobox cloud-based

sites.

through such a system.

I

It is

occasion, and found that

I

am

promotor be up front and disclose the

risks

if

a

company

is

earlier.

Imay have

not proﬁcient enough t0 access the

have n0 Drobox account and do not know
only reasonable,

behalf 0f

how

t0 access or navigate

requesting investment funds that the

and proposed use of the funds Without hiding such

information 0n a cloud-based website. (R., p. 23 1 .)
26.

Attached as Exhibit 18 are true and correct copies ofthe Schedules

to the ﬁnal Operating

Agreement 0f Gateway Parks LLC, from mid-2014.

C and

(R., pp.

started

up

in the Jan.

2014 season. None 0f the “big money” investors from the

such as Biber, Mervin Manufacturing, Windells Camp,
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Zimmerman Ventures

attached

425-427.)

0f the proposed locations ever got up and running for any length of time other than the

Which

1.1

site in

None
Eagle

ski industry,

0r Ripple Media, as

touted

by the promoter, ever invested any funds. The only other investors came

me and were

in after

individuals from outside the ski industry in amounts equal to 0r less than mine. (R., pp. 231-232.)

II.

1.

ISSUES PRESENTED

ON APPEAL

Whether, in View of conﬂicting afﬁdavits, the District Court erred in ruling that the Statute

of Limitations barred the fraud causes 0f action;

View of conﬂicting afﬁdavits, the
elements 0f fraud had not been shown;

2.

Whether,

3.

Whether

in

the District Court erred in ﬁnding that

District

Court erred in ruling that the

no material

issues of facts existed as t0

the fraud causes 0f action;

4.

Whether,

in

View of conﬂicting afﬁdavits, the

District

Court erred in ruling that res

judicata barred the fraud causes 0f action in the face 0f contradicting afﬁdavits;

5.

Whether the District Court erred in failing t0 resolve disputes
documents in favor of the non—moving parties;

6.

Whether the

District

ARGUMENT

Standard 0f Review.

A.

“On

appeal from the grant of a motion for

same standard of review used by

LLC v.

summary judgment,

the district court originally ruling

Von Jones, 353 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Idaho 2015),

this

Court

pleadings, depositions, and admissions

n0 genuine issue

as t0

any material

0n

fact

(citing t0

Arregui
is

ﬁle, together with the afﬁdavits, if any,

and

that the

moving party

matter 0f law.” [Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure] 56(0).
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“When

is

utilizes the

0n the motion.” Safaris

Main, 153 Idaho 801, 804, 291 P.3d 1000, 1003 (2012)). Summary judgment

is

and

Court erred in awarding attorney fees against Carter.
III.

Unlimited,

in the afﬁdavits

v.

Gallegos—

proper “if the

show

that there

entitled t0 a judgment as a

considering whether the evidence

shows

in the record

that there is

construe the facts, and draw

t0

Dulaney

v. St.

all

no genuine issue of material

this

court

must

reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.”

Alphonsus Reg'l Med.

Ctr.,

Court exercises free review.”

liberally

1d,, citing

137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002). “If the

evidence reveals no disputed issues of material

Which

fact, the trial

fact,

Id., citing t0

P.3d 396, 399 (2002); Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho

then only a question of law remains, over

Lapham

19, 23,

v.

Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585, 51

333 P.3d 130, 134 (2014). The District

Court failed to properly apply the standard of review as detailed below.

The District Court Erred in Finding that the Complaint was Barred by the
Applicable Statutes 0f Limitations.

B.

The

statute

0f limitations for the Complaint’s Count One for Fraud in the Inducement

governed by Idaho Code
Within three

An

§ 5-218(4)

Which

is

states:

(3) years:

on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause 0f action in
such case not t0 be deemed t0 have accrued until the discovery, by the
aggrieved party, 0f the facts constituting the fraud 01' mistake.
(4)

action for relief

Idaho Code § 5-218(4) (emphasis added).

The

statute

of limitations for Carters’ Count

Act of2004, Idaho Code

Which

§

30-14-501- General Fraud,

Two
is

for Violations 0f the

Uniform

governed by Idaho Code

§

Securities

30-14-509G)(2)

states:

§ 30-14-509.

CIVIL LIABILITY

(D.Statute of limitations.

A person may not obtain relief:

within the earlier of two (2) years after
discovery 0f the facts constituting the violation 0r ﬁve (5) years after the
(2)

.

.

.

,

unless the action

is

instituted

Violation.
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Idaho Code § 30-14-509(jX2) (emphasis added). Both causes of action d0 not accrue until the
facts supporting the fraud

have been discovered.

Issues of fact existed as t0

fraud claims were based.

facts

the

When

Carter reasonably discovered the facts

the

Dr. Carter’s afﬁdavit testiﬁed that he did not have knowledge 0f the

of misuse and improper expenditures of the investment funds until

Bank Statements were

upon which

ﬁrst produced in the

Neptune Case.

after

(R., pp.

May

17,

2016,

when

228-229, 356-358, 359-

388.)

There

On April
list

1,

is

evidence that the

Bank Statements were being intentionally concealed from Carter.

20 1 6, Neptune answered Interrogatory N0.

the date, amount, person obtaining, and use

from

Plaintiffs.”

Neptune pointed

at

5 in the

Neptune Case which asked, “Please

made 0f each and every draw

or funds advanced

and distanced himself from Gateway Parks by answering:

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO.

5:

A11 the

ﬁmds

LLC

contributed were capital contributions to

Gateway

Gateway Parks, LLC. Funds were used

t0 establish, register,

Parks,

the

Carters

and ended up in
insure, purchase

federal and state licenses,
for
all things Gateway Parks
ﬁnes
or
and
otherwise
registrations,
payroll
any
related. There is n0 speciﬁc purchase t0 Which Carter's funds were applied; only
any and all liabilities and assets Gateway Parks owned 0r owns as with all monies

equipment,

invested

by

travel

others.

cots,

taxes,

legal

expenses,

The ﬁnancials provided

in response t0 requests for production,

below, detail expenses and assets 0f Gateway Parks, LLC.
(R., p. 450.)

2016.

No Bank

Statements were produced with Neptune’s discovery responses 0n April

Obviously, Neptune did not want his personal expenditures from the

which would strengthen the claim of a personal

oral loan against

subsequent deposition testimony of Neptune on

May
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3,

2016

him

in the

ﬁmds

1,

discovered,

Neptune Case. The

also reasonably established that

Neptune was intentionally withholding and concealing the Bank Statements on
356-358.)

Neptune

When

state that the

Bank Statements were previously posted 0n an

Drobox. Nowhere does Neptune
the Internet or that

been uploaded
statement?”

-

Bank Statements 0n May

pressed for production of the

all is

needed

to the Internet.

is

on

May

t0 print

them

state

3,

2016

off,

that the

I

2016, nowhere does

known

as

are available

on

Internet site

Bank Statements

or that Neptune had copies that had previously

Rather, in response to the question

Neptune testiﬁed “No.

3,

that date. (R., pp.

-

“Do you have

can get them eventually” and “N0.

I

those bank

d0 not receive bank

statements [from the bank].” (R., pp. 357.)

Now

in the present case, in support

Neptune testiﬁed inconsistently and
had the Bank Statements

all

of Gateway Parks’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

to the contrary in his

Afﬁdavit dated March 21, 2019 that he

along in July of 2013 and had previously uploaded them 0n the

Internet:

10.

.

.

.

Ipersonally showed Carter from

my computer at home how to access and use

later showed him how t0 access Dropbox from a phone.
0f2013, Carter had access [0n Dropbox] t0 the June, 2013 bank account
statement from Neptune, Industries, Inc. which showed how Carter’s investment of

Dropbox.

I

11. In July

$100,000 in June [2013] was spent.
12. Bank account statements and all other ﬁnancial information continued
made available in Dropbox going forward.
(R., p. 61.)

Neptune never produced any corroboration such

t0

be

as an Internet screen shot

showing

bank statements on Dropbox With a date stamp 0r other date veriﬁcation. Neptune’s Afﬁdavit was
directly contradictory to his deposition testimony two-plus years earlier in

I

which he testiﬁed “No.

d0 not receive bank statements.” If Neptune’s summary judgment afﬁdavit were

he not

testify

on

true,

Why

did

May 3, 2016 that the Bank Statements have been uploaded t0 Dropbox and “here,
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Iwill just print

in

them off for you”? Appellants

any fashion,

let

assert that the

alone posted 0n the Internet, until

Bank Statements were never disclosed

May

17, 2016,

When

they were ﬁnally

produced in the Neptune Case.

Another issue 0f fact existed as
information to an Internet

site

to the reasonableness

of disclosure t0 an investor by posting

behind usemames and passwords. Gateway

is

basically arguing that

Carter should have seen the fraudulent use 0f funds earlier because such information

0n and available on Dropbox. Can a company hide
seen

it

0n the

Internet site” protected

know how to

set forth that

he

is

fraud

by

the arguing that

“you should have

by usernames and passwords? Reasonableness

issue for the jury. Dr. Carter testiﬁed that he

does not

its

was unable

access and navigate in the

t0 access

Drobox website.

was posted

is

a factual

and navigate 0n Drobox and

(R., p.

23 1 .) Carter’s afﬁdavit

not so computer savvy and that he was unable t0 enter and navigate Dropbox.

Neptune’s afﬁdavit says he showed Carter how t0 get on the Dropbox website. That dispute in the
evidence

is

also an issue of fact for the jury.

It is

unreasonable for a promoter and company to

contend that an investor is placed 0n notice of facts posted in a private website subj ect t0 usernames

and passwords. Nevertheless,

if that is the

Gateway’s position,

evidence to the jury for resolution of this factual dispute.
this case

Which the

District

It is

it

should be free to present such

an obvious issue of material fact in

Court should have resolved in Carter’s favor t0 deny summary

judgment.
Issue 0f facts included: (1) did
prior t0

May

17,

Bank Statements

2016 When

it

Gateway ever have

ﬁrst produced

them

its

June-August 2013 Bank Statements

t0 Carter in the

Neptune Case;

ever posted t0 the Internet cite Dropbox and When; and (3) if so,
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(2)

were the

was posting

ﬁnancial information t0 an Internet

site

Dropbox behind usernames and passwords a reasonable

method 0f disclosure t0 Carter as an investor. The

District

Court erred by resolving

all

these issues

of fact in favor of the moving party Gateway Parks, rather than in favor 0f the non—moving party

The

Carter.

Court found that Carter had notice

District

therefore dismissed the Complaint

The

on

earlier than the statute

0f limitations and

that erroneous basis.

Court should have relied upon the Afﬁdavit 0f Carter and

District

its

exhibits t0

conclude that a jury could ﬁnd that Carter did not reasonably know about or discover the fraudulent

misuse of funds

Complaint and

until after

Demand

May

17,

for Jury Trial

2016, the date the

was ﬁled

Bank Statements were produced. The

in this case

on

May

14,

2018, Within two years 0f

discovery and prior t0 ﬁve years after the alleged misuse of the investment funds in June 2013.

While Gateway Parks disputes Dr. Carter’s testimony
discovered the facts 0f fraud,

moving

party.

On that basis,

an issue 0f material fact that

in the

is

0r should have

resolved in favor of the non-

the District Court should be reversed.

and Securities Fraud Were Satisﬁed
Record by Carters’ Afﬁdavits and Exhibits as Evidence.

District

Court ruled that the elements 0f fraud had not been established in the record

and dismissed the Complaint on

Carters’ afﬁdavits

that basis.

favorable, did in fact set forth sufﬁcient evidence t0 satisfy

fraud in the inducement and fraud. This Idaho

the case

When he knew

All Elements of Fraud in the Inducement

C.

The

it is

as t0

ofBudget Truck Sales,

LLC v.

all

and

exhibits,

When Viewed

elements of causes 0f action for

Supreme Court recently taught those elements

Tilley, et. al.,

the following:
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in

163 Idaho 841, 419 P.3d 1139 (2018), With

“.

Idaho law ﬁrmly allows that fraud in the inducement

always admissible to
show that representations by one party were a material part of the bargain.” Aspiazu
v. Mortimer, 139 Idaho 548, 551, 82 P.3d 830, 833 (2003) (internal quotations and
.

.

A

citation omitted).

is

contract, including a settlement agreement, that has

procured through the use 0f fraudulent representations

Rumely Thresher Ca, 51 Idaho

at 168,

4 P.2d

is

voidable.

been

Advance—

at 659. Indeed, “[f]raud Vitiates the

speciﬁc terms of the agreement and can provide a basis for demonstrating that the
parties agreed t0

something apart from or in addition to the written documents.”

at 551, 82 P.3d at 833. Therefore, generally, “the theory is that
because 0f fraud, there was no contract.” Utilities Eng’g Inst. v. Criddle, 65 Idaho
201, 209, 141 P.2d 981, 985 (1943). This is the case “Whether the fraud enters into

Aspiazu, 139 Idaho

the execution of the contract or

is

antecedent t0

it”

stipulation to the contrary contained in the contract.”

Ca,

and “regardless of any

Advance—Rumely Thresher

51 Idaho at 168, 4 P.2d at 659. Accordingly, fraud in the inducement

is

applicable t0 the alleged facts in this case. Thus, the settlement agreement between
Tilley and the

by

2.

Budget Parties may be invalidated by a showing

that

it

was procured

fraud.

The Budget

Parties submitted evidence that created a genuine issue of material

fact regarding their claim

T0

of fraud in the inducement.

establish fraud or misrepresentation, a party

must prove each of the following

elements: (1) a statement 0r representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality;
(4) the speaker’s knowledge about its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the
speaker’s intent that there be reliance; (6) the hearer’s ignorance 0f the falsity 0f
the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justiﬁable reliance; and (9) resultant

Dev. Grp., LLC v. Caravella, 157 Idaho 589, 594, 338 P.3d 1193,
“The
1198 (2014).
party alleging intentional misrepresentation or fraud has the
burden 0f proving the elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence.”
Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 225, 46 P.3d 518, 521 (2002). We hold that the
evidence submitted by the Budget Parties establishes a genuine issue of material
injury. Frontier

fact regarding their claim

0f fraud in the inducement.

Budget Truck Sales, LLC, 163 Idaho
Sales,

LLC’s claim

that

it

was

at

847, 419 P.3d at 1145.

The dispute involved Budget Truck

fraudulently induced into entering a settlement agreement.

This

Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded based upon the existence of a
genuine issue of material

fact.

The evidence 0f each causal element

for fraud in the present case is addressed in turn.

_20_

Inducement: Dr. Carter testiﬁed

that but for the fraudulent representations,

the

i.e.

ﬁmds

would only be used on Gateway expenses, he would not have invested in Gateway Park. He would
The fraud

not have entered the investment arrangement and funded $200,000. (R., pp. 230-23 1 .)
“Vitiates” 0r “voids” the investment agreement. Id.

(1)

Statement/representation 0f

stated that the

fact: Dr. Carter testiﬁed that

proposed invested funds would be used to

start

Gateway Parks’ promoter

up Gateway Parks and expand

to a

City 0f Eagle location. (R., pp. 225, 230-23 1 .)
(2) Falsity:

The Bank Statements and other documents demonstrated

invested funds were

ﬁmds were used

NOT

used for start—up of Gateway Parks of the Eagle location. Rather the

for the personal expenses of the

and Superparks LLC.

Industries

that in large part the

(R., pp.

promoter and for past due

bills

0f Neptune

228-230, 359-427.)

(3) Materiality: Dr. Carter testiﬁed that the representation as t0 the intended

invested funds

(4)

was an important and material term of the investment.

Speaker’s knowledge 0f

falsity:

As Gateway

(R., p. 225,

Parks’ promoter

made

request for investment 0n June 6, 2013, the exhibits reveal that 0n that date: his

was

in arrears

$250,000

by two payments

(R., pp.

(R., pp.

1]

One

credit card

404-406); the bank account for his

two payments

(R., pp.

Industries, Inc.

was overdrawn with no revenue coming

his pitch

and

maxed

out at

was maxed out and behind by

100% owned company, Neptune

in (R., p. 367); the

100% owned company, Superparks LLC, was overdrawn and bouncing
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10.)

home mortgage

389-392); his personal line of credit was

393-397); his personal Capital

use of the

bank account

for his

checks, With n0 revenue

coming
credit,

is

in (R., p. 379). In short there

draws, payrolls, legal

bills,

were no funds available

accounting

bills, taxes,

to

pay Neptune’s mortgage,

cable expense, daily lunches,

line

etc.

of

There

a very strong inference from this evidence that as Gateway Parks’ promoter coaxed investment

money from

Dr. Carter

the investment

knew 0f the

on June

6,

2013, the promoter

ﬁmds — bail himself and his

falsity

entities out

knew

exactly what he

of ﬁnancial

was going

to

d0 with

distress. Therefore, the

speaker

0f the representation;

(5)(7)&(8) Reliance: Dr. Carter testiﬁed that he relied 0n the representation, that he

understood the promoter intended for him to

rely,

and

that

it

was reasonable

because the represented use 0f the invested funds would be What would
project forward (R., p. 225,

(6)

225,

1]

10; R., pp.

know

that the

false representation as to

10);

(9)

the

Gateway Parks

230-231, ﬂ 23);

Hearer’s ignorance 0f falsity: Dr. Carter testiﬁed

prior to investing to

making a

1]

move

for Carter to rely

that

he had n0 information or

promoter for Gateway Parks was in ﬁnancial

how the

investment funds would be used (R.,

p.

facts

distress or

224,

1]

was

9; R., p.

and
Resultant damage: Dr. Carter testiﬁed that as a result of the misrepresentation and

misuse ofhis investment funds, he has been damaged by the loss 0f $200,000

Each element of fraud

in the

(R., p. 231,

1]

24).

inducement and fraud are present above based upon Carters’

evidence presented.

The cause 0f action

for Violations

0f the Uniform Securities Act 0f 2004, Idaho Code

14-501- General Fraud are as follows:
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§ 30-

GENERAL FRAUD

§ 30-14-501.
It is unlawful for a person, in connection With the offer, sale, 0r purchase 0f a
security, directly 0r indirectly:

To employ a device, scheme, 0r artiﬁce t0 defraud;
T0
make an untrue statement 0f a material fact 0r t0 omit to state a material fact
(2)
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under
(1)

which they were made, not misleading;

To engage

(3)

in

an

act, practice,

operate as a fraud 0r deceit

To

(4)

t0

divert investor

or course of business that operates 0r

would

upon another person; 0r

money

t0 the personal use

of the

pay prior investors Without speciﬁcally disclosing
money.

issuer, offeror or seller, or

that use before receiving the

investor's

The same testimony and evidence
501

-

and there

is

no need

Summary Judgment 0n the

set forth

above supports the elements for Violations of § 30-14-

t0 repeat that evidence a

second time.

Gateway Parks’ Motion

elements 0f fraud should have been denied

have Viewed Carter’s afﬁdavit in the presumptive favorable

light.

if the District

The

for

Court would

District Court’s dismissal

0f the Complaint, t0 the extent based upon the assertion that Carters did not

set forth

evidence of

the required elements, should be reversed.

Carters’ Claims 0f

D.

Fraud Should Not Be Barred by the Doctrine 0f Res

Judicata.

The

District Court also dismissed the

Neptune Case barred
set out

by

this

this case

Supreme Court

upon

Complaint on the erroneous basis

the doctrine of res judicata.

that the previous

The doctrine 0f resjudicata

as follows:

The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and
issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57
P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same
parties upon the same claim or upon claims “relating to the same cause 0f action
Which might have been made.” Id. Issue preclusion protects litigants from litigating
an identical issue with the same party 0r its privy. Rodriguez v. Dep’t 0f Corn, 136
Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 403 (2001). Separate
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tests are

used to determine Whether

is

claim preclusion 0r issue preclusion applies. See D.A.R., Inc.

Sheﬂer, 134 Idaho

v.

141, 144, 997 P.2d 602, 605 (2000).

Five factors are required in order for issue preclusion to bar the relitigation of an
issue determined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party against

decision

was

asserted

had a

full

and

fair

whom

the earlier

opportunity to litigate the issue decided in

the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation

was

identical to the issue

presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually
decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a ﬁnal judgment on the merits in the
prior litigation;

and

(5) the party against

Whom the

issue

is

asserted

was a party 0r

in privity with a party to the litigation.

For claim preclusion

same

parties; (2)

Ticor Title C0.

v.

t0 bar a

subsequent action there are three requirements: (1)
(3) ﬁnal judgment.

same claim; and

Stanion 144 Idaho 119, 123-126, 157 P.3d 613, 617-620 (2007).

Claim preclusion

(or “true” res judicata) as

deﬁned above does not apply

because Gateway Parks was not a party t0 the Neptune Case.

was

not

The Neptune Case consisted only 0f a breach of

exist.

Neptune Case does not

enrichment claim against a different party.

exist.

N0

Therefore, the element 0f “same

In addition, the element 0f “same claim” does

parties” as

in the

in this case

fraud

oral loan

was alleged or

agreement and an unjust

tried in the

Neptune Case.

This present case consists 0f only fraud and securities Violation claim against a different party.

Those are

totally different causes

Issue preclusion as

the

Neptune Case was not

loan claim

is

much

of action against totally different

deﬁned above does not apply

parties.

in this case because the issue decided in

“identical t0 the issue presented in the present case.”

different in scope, elements,

Again, an oral

and burden 0f proof against an individual, as
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compared t0 the fraud and securities Violations against the present corporate

entity,

Gateway Parks.

Further the fraud and securities Violations claims were not “actually decided” in the Neptune Case

t0 a

ﬁnal judgment.

Gateway Parks

will argue that in the

legal determination against Carters that the

without any fraud. That

made

a factual and

advanced ﬁmds were properly spent by Gateway Parks

not a party t0 the Neptune Case. The only factual/legal

Neptune Case were Whether the advanced funds 0f $200,000 were a personal loan

Neptune and his

Gateway

District Court

not true. The District Court in the Neptune Case did not consider 0r

is

make such ﬁndings. Gateway Parks was
issues in the

Neptune Case, the

entity

Neptune

Industries, Inc., 0r

Parks. (R., pp. 68-83.)

The

District

Whether the funds were a capital investment in

Court in the Neptune Case did make the following

statement: “A11 of the funds were properly accounted for as capital contributions t0

exchange for an ownership

were given

interest in the

credit to Carters

t0

company.”

(R., p. 82.)

Gateway

in

And that is true — all the $200,000

and “accounted for as capital contributions

t0

Gateway”

in the

amount

0f $200,000. Carters received the $200,000 membership in Gateway Parks along With about 10
other subsequent investors.

However,

that is

NOT

a ﬁnding that

Gateway Parks

properly, or

improperly, or fraudulently, used the capital contributions for an improper purpose.
separate and undecided questions at issue in this fraud case against

Gateway Parks
it

should get a win on

the

Neptune Case. In

asserted

its

on summary judgment

that

it

was

fraud claims, just as Neptune obtained a

effect,

Gateway Parks

is

arguing that
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it is

Gateway

Parks.

in priVity with

win on his

Those are

Neptune, so that

oral contract claim in

the alter ego of Neptune.

Such

an argument ignores the corporate shield and form of the LLC.
are at least 10 other

member investors

Lastly, Carters did not

in the

have a

in

full

Gateway
and

fair

It

also ignores the fact that there

Parks. (R., pp. 231-232, ﬂ 26; R., pp. 425-427)

opportunity t0 present the fraud/security claims

Neptune Case. The Bank Statements were only produced on

May

17,

2016 giving

rise to

discovery of the fraud, after being concealed up t0 that date. The deadline in the Neptune Case for

amending the Complaint

to join other parties

vacated t0 accommodate

new defense

Court had made

it

amend

counsel, the

trial

was

trial set

re-set t0

amended

the complaint in the

the Complaint t0 add completely

new and

E.

May

31,

2016 had been

begin July 20, 2016, and the

in favor for

Gateway Parks should be reversed 0n

Neptune Case

t0 join a

different causes of action.

The

res judicata does not bar the Complaint in the present case.

judgment

for

abundantly clear that he would not allow further amendments or delays.

pp. 428-432.) Carters could not have

partyl or

had passed, the

District Court’s

(R.,

new

Therefore,

summary

that basis.

Attorney Fees.

In the event this Court reverses the

summary judgment

Appellants also request that the District Court’s

Memorandum

entered by the District Court,

Decision and Order on Motion t0

Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees ﬁled October 10, 2019 (Supp. R., pp. 55-59) be reversed.

1

It

may be worth

noting that early in the Neptune Case regarding the contract claim, the Neptune

claiming that Gateway Parks,

LLC was

an indispensable party.

The Court denied

moved

t0 dismiss

the motion ruling that “In sum,

because the evidence submitted suggests Gateway was not a party to the original oral agreement and disposition of
the Carters’ claims would neither impair Gateway’s interest 0r subject Neptune and NI t0 multiple 0r inconsistent
obligations, this Court concludes that Gateway is not a necessary party whose presence must be compelled.” (R., p.
439.)
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Appellants would then reserve their rights t0 attorney fees on this appeal t0 be awarded, if at
after

ﬁnal disposition on remand and

trial in

In the event this Court sustains the

Appellants
that this

still

was a

that

it

the District Court.

summary judgment

entered by the District Court,

request that the District Court’s award of attorney fees be reversed on the basis

tort

claim for fraud not a commercial transaction under

In order t0 establish an

show

all,

was

award of attorney fees pursuant

to

LC.

the prevailing party in an action to recover

I.C. § 12-120(3).

§ 12-120(3), a litigant

must

on a contract or commercial

transaction. I.C. § 12-120(3) provides as follows:

In any civil action t0 recover

on an open account, account

stated, note, bill,

negotiable instrument, guaranty, 0r contract relating t0 the purchase or sale of

goods, wares, merchandise, 0r services and in any commercial transaction unless

otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney’s fee to be set by the court, t0 be taxed and collected as costs.

Idaho Code § 12-120(3) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs’

1.

claim of fraud in the inducement was a tort claim that was outside the

scope 0f Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
This Supreme Court has upheld the denial of attorney fees under LC.
basis that the tort claim of conversion

Ranches,

Inc.,

were asserted

was outside

§

12-120(3) 0n the

the scope of that provision. Brooks

v.

Gigray

128 Idaho 72, 910 P.2d 744 (1996). In the Brooks case, breach 0f contract claims

in addition to the conversion claim.

The Court addressed the

fact that in Brooks, the

defendant’s counterclaim could have been pled as a breach 0f contract, rather than as the tort 0f
conversion. “Although there

was too

far

was

a commercial transaction involved, the commercial transaction

removed from the theory 0f recovery

t0 warrant application
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of LC.

§ 12-120(3).” Id.

at 79.

The Court

cited t0

Brower v.

E.I.

DuPont De Nemours

& C0.,

117 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345

(1990) as follows:

These cases lead t0 the conclusion that the award 0f attorney’s fees is not warranted
every time a commercial transaction is remotely connected with the case. Rather,
the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen 0f the
lawsuit. Attorney’s fees are not appropriate under I.C. § 12-120(3) unless the
commercial transaction is integral t0 the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which
the party is attempting t0 recover. To hold otherwise would be t0 convert the award
of attorney’s fees from an exceptional remedy justiﬁed only by statutory authority
t0 a matter of right in Virtually every lawsuit ﬁled.
Id. (citing to

Brower

at

784, 792 P.2d at 349).

There are two stages to

and

integral to the claim;

sought. Id.

(ii)

this analysis: (i) there

must be a commercial transaction

the commercial transaction

that is

must be the basis upon Which recovery

is

The court held that a claim based upon tort does not support an award 0f fees pursuant

to I.C. § 12-120(3).

“The

fact that the conversion claim arose out

0f a commercial transaction

is

not sufﬁcient t0 apply LC. § 12-120(3): ‘the commercial transaction must be integral to the claim

and constitute the basis upon Which the party is attempting t0 recover.
C0.

v.

’”

Id. (citing to Ervz'n Constr.

Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 704, 874 P.2d 506, 515 (1993)).
In

McPheters

clearly stated

its

v.

Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 64 P.3d 3 17 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court

position that Idaho

Under LC.

Code

§ 12-120(3)

§ 12-120(3), attorney fees

does not apply t0

may be awarded

tort claims:

t0 the prevailing party in a

dispute involving a contract or commercial transaction.

IDAHO CODE

§

12-

This statute does not apply t0 a claim for attorneyfees when the
action involves a tort, even ifthe underlying action was a commercial transaction.
120(3) (2002).

Rice

v.

Litster,

132 Idaho 897, 901, 980 P.2d 561, 565 (1999); Sammis

v.

Magnetek,

Ina, 130 Idaho 342, 354, 941 P.2d 314, 326 (1997). In this case, the basis of
McPheters’ claim is negligence, a tort action. Since the basis of McPheters’ claim
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is tort,
1

Id. at

the respondents are not entitled to an

award 0f attorney fees under

I.C. § 12-

20(3 ).

397 (emphasis added). The analysis of this Supreme Court

in the Brooks,

Brower, Ervin

Construction, and McPheters cases establish that the Court should 100k to the claims asserted

the parties to determine the

gravamen 0f the

action.

Respondent Gateway Parks will argue

0f“gravamen ofthe case” analysis under LC.
v.

My Web

Wholesaler,

“prohibits a fee

that there

award

for a

be a contract.

Appellants have not

LLC

by

that the line

0f cases cited above for the proposition

§ 12-120(3), has

been overruled. The case ofBlz'mka

143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007) only overruled any case that

commercial transaction that involves tortious conduct” 0r “require

Any

previous holdings t0 the contrary are overruled.”

made such an argument or cited cases

Id.

at

728-729.

for that proposition. Rather, Appellants

argue the “gravamen of the action” analysis of this Supreme Court in the Brooks, Brower, Ervin
Construction, and McPheters cases
analysis and authorities

still

is still

Viable to determine the

gravamen 0f the

action. That

stand and are applicable. In Blimka the claims involved contractual

breaches of warranty in addition to the fraud claim, and therefore the court awarded attorney fees.
In the present case, Carter brought only fraud claims With only tortious elements of fraud.

basis, Appellants

the

award

On that

urge the Court t0 ﬁnd that fraud was the “gravamen 0f the action” and reverse

for attorney fees.

The amount invested and amount of equity acquired by Carters

not disputed. The gravamen of the action

is

are

tortious fraud.

In the present case before this Court, Carters’ claim for fraud in the inducement

is

claim and Gateway Parks’ award of attorney fees under LC. § 12-120(3) should be reversed.
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a tort

2.

Gateway Parks was not

entitled t0 attorney fees for defense 0f Plaintiffs’ statutory

claim for Violation 0f the Anti—Fraud provisions 0f the Uniform Securities Act
under Idaho Code § 30-14-501.

The

anti-fraud provision of the

Uniform Securitas Act, Idaho Code

§

30-14-501,

is

applicable to both registered and unregistered investment security offerings. “Section 501 applies

m
t0

any

securities offer, sale or purchase, including offers, sales, 0r purchases involving registered,

0r federal covered securities.” Ofﬁcial

the fraud, misleading, and deceit.

fraudulent securities offer allegation

is

statutory version to the tort of fraud

imposed 0n security/investment

In the case presently before this Court, the Carters’ claim

provision of the Uniform Securities Act at Idaho

Securities

securities but provides

to

award a prevailing

seller

merely the analogous

was based upon

its

Act provides for reasonable attorney fees

no authority

It is

offerings.

Code §§ 30-14-501

prohibits fraud in connection With securities offerings and includes

The Uniform

The gravamen 0f a

Comment, emphasis added.

-

the anti-fraud

509, which speciﬁcally

own attorney fee provision.

t0 a defrauded purchaser

of

0f securities under Idaho Code

§ 30-14-509(b)(1),(3).

Under LC.
transaction based

§ 12- 120(3),

on a contract

While the prevailing party in a
is

Whether a commercial transaction
the

gravamen of the claim.”

entitled t0

is

Willie

involving a commercial

an award 0f reasonable attorney

involved in a claim

v.

civil action

is

fees,

“[t]he test for

Whether the commercial transaction

Board 0f Trustees, 138 Idaho

131, 136, 59 P.3d 302,

is

307

(2002) (citing to Brower at 784) (emphasis added). This Supreme Court held in Willie that actions

brought for breach of an employment contract are considered commercial transactions and are
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subj ect to the attorney fee provision of LC. § 12-120(3), however, attorney fees

under that provision when the claim

is

based upon a statutory provision.

This Court has held attorney fees under
is

were not available

§

12-120(3) are unavailable

when the claim

based 0n a statutory provision. Shay

v. Cesler, 132 Idaho 585, 587-89, 977 P.2d
However, attorney fees are unavailable under § 12-120(3) for
claims only When the statute upon which the claim is brought includes its

199, 201-03 (1999).
statutory

own

attorney fee provision.

1d.

Attorney fees under § 12-120(3) are unavailable on the basis that the claim was brought

under a statutory anti-fraud provision of the Uniform Securities Act which includes
attorney fee provision.

its

own

This Court should, therefore, reverse the award for attorney fees on that

basis.

The Attorney Fee Award Was Excessive and Unreasonable by

3.

the

Amount

0f

$9,875 in Attorney Fees Spent 0n an Unnecessary Expert Witness Proj ect.

By
obj ections

for

objecting the reasonableness 0f the attorney fees, Appellants d0 not waive the above

and continue

t0 assert that there is

no basis

Gateway Parks ﬁled an Answer, answered one

partial

day deposition, authored two

some necessary background
services,

briefs

set

award attorney

legal services associated therewith.

excessive, and overreaching because

it

fees. In this case,

counsel

of simple written discovery; defended one

and attended two hearings.

Gateway Parks was awarded $58,250

unnecessary

to

Granted there would be

However, on those limited

in attorney fees.

That claim

is

legal

exorbitant,

included $9,875 for time spent on an irrelevant and

CPA witness.
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The

District Court correctly disallowed a claim for

$19,425 from a purported

CPA expert

Witnesses, ﬁnding “that none of Defendant’s experts ever testiﬁed in this case, and the Court never

considered any expert opinion during the

summary judgment

proceedings, in this case the Court

cannot ﬁnd that Defendant’s requested discretionary costs in the amount of $19,467 were
necessary and exceptional.” (Suppl. R.

and report shows

made

that they did

(R., pp.

763-778.)

A review of the

supposed

CPA

experts’ billings

no forensic accounting 0r analysis whatsoever. Rather, the CPAs

a legal analysis inappropriately

expertise.

p. 57.)

commenting on

The awarded attorney

the evidence outside 0f an accounting

fee claim

by Gateway Parks included 39.5

hours for $9,875 0n this unnecessary project. (See the yellow highlighted entries on the attorney
billings, Suppl. R., pp. 29-45.)

Respondent’s counsel interacted with, met with, and telephoned

the accountants, incurring 39.5 hours of time,

CPAS’ supposed expert

report

all

0f Which had n0 bearing on the case. Indeed, the

would have been inadmissible because

analysis, but a legal analysis, outside their proper expertise.

it

was not an accounting

Since the District Court correctly

disallowed the experts’ fee claim as being unnecessary, the District Court abused

its

discretion in

allowing the attorney fees attributable to that project, Which fees were not reasonable and necessary
legal services,

and should have been disallowed in the amount 0f $9,875.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Appellants respectfully request that
District Court’s

Memorandum

of Decision and Order 0n Motion for

3rd

day of February, 2020.

EVANS KEANE LLP

By
Jed

/s/ Jed W. Manwaring
W. Manwaring, Of the Firm

Attorneys for Appellants
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Court reverse the

Summary Judgment and

Judgment 0f Dismissal.
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